Serge Dupont on Moral Hazard in COVID-19 Policy Responses

Serge Dupont and Kevin Lynch co-author a policy brief for the Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School (JSGS) of Public Policy on moral hazard in the Canadian government's response to the COVID-19 crisis.

They examine three potential manifestations of moral hazard in the emergency policy responses of government to the pandemic—and why containing moral hazard can entail tough choices:

• An expectation that the Government can insure all Canadians against all risks all the time
• The nationalization of private debt through an extension of access to credit to businesses into financial bail-outs
• An expansion of public borrowing at the expense of succeeding generations of Canadians

The policy brief is part of a JSGS series dedicated to exploring and providing evidence-based analysis, policy ideas, recommendations and research conclusions on the various dimensions of the pandemic, as it relates here in Canada and internationally.